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Abstract
We examine the role of changing mortality in explaining the rise of retirement over the
course of the 20th century. We construct a model in which individuals make labor/leisure
choices over their lifetimes subject to uncertainty about their date of death. In an envi-
ronment in which mortality is high, an individual who saved up for retirement would face
a high risk of dying before he could enjoy his planned leisure. In this case, the optimal
plan is for people to work until they die. As mortality falls, however, it becomes optimal
to plan, and save for, retirement. We simulate our model using actual changes in the
US life table over the last century, and show that this “uncertainty eﬀect” of declining
mortality would have more than outweighed the “horizon eﬀect” by which rising life ex-
pectancy would have led to later retirement. One of our key results is that continuous
changes in mortality can lead to discontinuous changes in retirement behavior.
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One of the most dramatic economic changes that has taken place in the last 100 years has
been the rise in retirement as an important stage of life. At the beginning of the Twentieth
century, retirement was a rarity. Many people didn’t live into old age, and most of those
who did continued to work until shortly before death. By the end of the century, the vast
majority of workers could expect to experience a prolonged period of healthy leisure after
their working years were over.
Needless to say, the economic repercussions of this change in the life cycle pattern of labor
supply have been enormous. Since a signiﬁcant fraction of consumption during retirement is
publicly funded, the growth in retirement has strained government budgets - a phenomenon
which will soon be exacerbated by population aging (Weil, 1997). Meanwhile private funding
of anticipated retirements has led to the accumulation of vast pools of capital. Exactly what
fraction of current capital accumulation can be attributed to life cycle savings is an issue of
contentious debate. Modigliani’s (1986) estimate is that as much as 80% of wealth can be
attributed to life cycle saving, while Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1988) estimates that it is only
20%. According to Lee (1998), the fraction of wealth attributable to life cycle saving in the
US doubled between 1900 and 1990.
Explaining the rise in retirement has been a major endeavor for economists in the last
several decades. Three prominent explanations can be discerned. The ﬁrst is that the public
pension programs, such as Social Security in the United States, have been instrumental in
pushing workers out of the labor force, particularly through high implicit rates of taxation on
wage income earned at older ages (Gruber and Wise, 1998). The second explanation is that
rising lifetime income has led workers to optimally choose a larger period of leisure at the end
of life (Costa, 1998). The ﬁnal explanation is that changes in the technology of production
have lowered the productivity of older workers, leading employers to seek to get rid of them
(Graebner, 1980; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). None of these explanations, either taken separately
or as a group, has been a completely satisfactory explanation for the rise in retirement. This
paper proposes a new explanation for the rise in retirement, which we call the “uncertainty
eﬀect.” It is not meant to be a complete substitute for the factors discussed above, but rather
as an addition to the set of usual suspects that must be considered in explaining the rise of
retirement.
In our model, the driving force behind the change in the life-cycle pattern of labor supply
is a change in the pattern of mortality. Individuals make labor/leisure choices over their
1lifetimes subject to uncertainty about their date of death. In an environment in which
mortality is high, an individual who saved up for retirement would face a high risk of dying
before he could enjoy his planned leisure. In this case, the optimal plan is for individuals
to work until they die. As mortality falls, however, individuals will ﬁnd it optimal to plan,
and save for, retirement. The eﬀect of falling mortality on labor supply complements several
other eﬀects of falling mortality, most notably on human capital investment and fertility, that
have been analyzed in recent literature.1
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In section two, we brieﬂy examine histor-
ical data on mortality and retirement, and also discuss at greater length some of the other
explanations for the rise of retirement. Section three presents and solves our model of en-
dogenous retirement in a stripped-down economic environment, in which the other factors
aﬀecting retirement that were discussed above are not present. Section four looks at the inter-




Falling mortality has been one of the most signiﬁcant aspects of the process of economic
growth over the last several centuries. Male Life expectancy at birth in the United States
rose from 40.17 in 1850 to 47.81 in 1900 and 78.42 in 1990 (Haines (1994), Keyﬁtz and Flieger
(1990)). The most signiﬁcant component of mortality decline has been the reduction in infant
and child deaths. Obviously, this aspect of the morality decline is not related to the issues
of retirement saving that we discuss in this paper. Although the decline in adult mortality
has not been quite as dramatic as that for children, it has nevertheless be a signiﬁcant part
of the story of economic growth over the last century or more. Figure 1 shows the number
of survivors from a cohort of 20-year-olds who would be alive at diﬀerent ages, using life
tables from the United States for 1850, 1900, 1950 and 1990. In 1850, the probability that a
20-year-old would reach age 65 was only roughly 40%. By 1990, it was roughly 80%.2Figure
2 shows the probability of death on a log scale.
1See Meltzer (1992), Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Eckstein et al. (1998), Kalemli-Ozcan (2001).
2The total number of expected remaining years of life for a 20-year-old male rose from 38 to 52 over this
period.
22.2 Retirement
Paralleling the reduction in adult mortality has been a massive increase in retirement. In
1930, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65 and over was 58%. By 2001, it
had fallen to 17.5%.3 The trend in retirement prior to the Great Depression has been a
subject of controversy among historians. Ransom and Sutch (1986, 1988) claim that labor
force participation rate for men over 60 was roughly constant between 1870 and 1930, while
Costa (1998) and Moen (1994) argue that labor force participation for older men had been
declining since the late Nineteenth Century.4
Examining the labor force participation of the elderly does not tell the full story, of course,
since, as shown above, a large fraction of the population never lived to this age. Carter and
Sutch (1996) estimate that at the beginning of the twentieth century, a 55-year-old man
had only a 21.5% probability of retiring before he died, excluding “death-bed retirement”
associated with illness in the last weeks of life.
Another way to demonstrate the dramatic rise in retirement is to look at how the expected
number of years that an individual would spend retired has changed over time. This measure
incorporates both changes in mortality and changes in labor force behavior. The expected
fraction of adult life spent retired rose from 6.7% for the cohort of men who began working
in 1850 to 12.3% for the cohort that began its working life in 1900 and to an estimated 31.0%
for the cohort that began working in 1990 (Lee, 1996).
While we will argue that the decline in mortality is one explanation for the fall in labor
force participation of the elderly, it would be foolish to argue that it is the only one. Since
we cannot incorporate all of these eﬀects into a single model, our approach will be to ask
how large a change in retirement could plausibly be explained by the mortality eﬀect alone,
in a model where the other factors are not present. In the rest of this section, however, we
brieﬂy discuss three other channels.
The most obvious alternative explanation for the decline in labor force participation of the
elderly is the creation of old-age insurance programs like Social Security. Economists diﬀer
over the question of what fraction of the increase in retirement can be explained by changes
3Such a change could theoretically be due to a changing age distribution of the population over 65 in the
presence of constant age-speciﬁc participation rates. This is not the case, however: age speciﬁc participation
rates have also fallen dramatically. See Costa (1998) and Lumsdaine and Wise (1994).
4Matthews, et. al. (1982) give the labor force participation rates for men aged 65 and over in the U.K.
declining over time in manner similar to those in the U.S. 1881: 73.6%; 1901: 61.4%; 1921: 58.9%; 1931:
47.9%; 1951: 31.1%; 1973: 18.6%.
3in Social Security policies. Danziger, et. al. (1981), reviewing several studies, conclude that
it is best to “attribute as an upper bound one-half of the decline in the older male labor force
since 1950 to Social Security’s work disincentives.”5 By contrast, Gruber and Wise (1998)
argue that Social Security and other government policies explain a large fraction of the rise in
early retirement. Even if this latter conclusion is correct, however, such an observation still
leaves open the question of why these policies have evolved as they did. It may be that Social
Security policies themselves should be viewed as an endogenous response to other factors that
increased the desirability of retirement.
A second explanation for the rise in retirement focuses on the income eﬀect of higher
wages. In a taste-based model of retirement, the association of higher income per capita with
longer retirement comes about because people in richer countries choose to spend a higher
fraction of their income on retirement. When the wage increases, there is an income eﬀect,
which leads to the purchase of more of all normal goods, including leisure, and a substitution
eﬀect, which works to reduce leisure by raising its opportunity cost. For higher income to
lead to longer retirement, not only must the income eﬀect dominate, but there must be
some reason why this leisure must be taken at the end of life, rather than spread out evenly.
The best argument for this phenomenon is that there is some kind of non-convexity in the
enjoyment of leisure; a simple example would be that only people with full time leisure can
move to Florida.6
A third explanation for the increase in retirement looks toward production technology.
This explanation starts with the notion that older workers are less able to do certain tasks
than younger ones. If the nature of production shifts toward those tasks over time, then the
labor force participation of older people should go down. The argument that the nature of
production has changed is presented in Graebner (1980) and Moen (1988). Moen argues that
the decline of agriculture as a source of employment led to an increasing physical separation
of the home and the workplace, making a gradual withdrawal from the labor force no longer
possible.7 Similarly, as factory labor and hourly wages replaced piece rate work, it became
5p. 996.
6This is the argument of Costa (1998). Similarly, Fields and Mitchell (1984) argue that in the U.S. setting,
retirement is well modeled as “a choice based on balancing the monetary gains from continued work versus
leisure forgone,” rather than as stemming from mandatory retirement regulations or ill health. Mandatory
retirement covered only a minority of workers during the period at which they look, and they estimate that it
was binding in the retirement decisions of only two or three percent of retiring workers. The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1978 and subsequent legislation, which have virtually eliminated mandatory retirement,
have had little eﬀect on actual retirement patterns.
7Long (1958) rejects the argument that urbanization was the cause in the decline of labor force participation
4harder for an older employee to work at his own pace. Graebner argues that it is the nature
of large scale, technologically advanced production to demand standardized workers.8
As an alternative to changes in productive technology, the cause of the increase in re-
tirement could theoretically lie in changes in the technology of health and longevity. If the
fraction of older people who are unable to perform relevant tasks increases, labor force partici-
pation rates should go down. The evidence, however, points in exactly the opposite direction:
as retirement has increased the health of the elderly has improved (Fields and Mitchell, 1984).
In 1994, 89 percent of those between 65 and 74 reported “no disability whatsoever.”9
3 Model
The explanation for rising retirement considered here looks to the very reduction in mortality
discussed above. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the change in the uncertainty regarding mortality.
This point can be seen most clearly by looking at Figure 3. The ﬁgure shows the probability
of dying at diﬀerent ages, conditional on having reached age 20, using the cross-sectional
male life tables for 1900 and 1990. The fact that the mean age of death goes up (from 61.2
to 73.5 ) is hardly surprising. What is more interesting is that the standard deviation of the
age of death falls, from 18.1 to 14.9. And of course the coeﬃcient of variation in the age of
death (the standard deviation divided by the mean) falls by even more, from 0.30 to 0.20. By
2050, the mean age of death is expected to further rise, to 76.5, while the standard deviation
will also rise, to 15.4. The coeﬃcient of variation will remain almost exactly constant.
How should declining mortality aﬀect the retirement age? Two diﬀerent forces are at
work. First, and most intuitively, longer life would be expected to increase the number of
years during which an individual plans to work, simply because longer life means that there
will be more years of consumption which need to be paid for. We call this channel the
for men over 65 over the period 1890-1950. The rate of labor force participation was higher in rural areas, but
the decline was sharp in both areas: 5.4% per decade in rural areas, 4.4% per decade in urban areas. The rate
of decline for the country as a whole was 5.4% per decade, indicating that there was some eﬀect of movement
from rural to urban areas.
8A diﬀerent mechanism by which technological change can lead to retirement is by making old workers
obsolete, either because older workers are slower at learning new productive techniques, or because it is not
worthwhile for older workers to learn new techniques, since they will have less time in the labor force in which
to employ them. Graebner (1980) documents the widespread notion that retirement resulted because it was
easier to train new workers than to retrain old ones. Both of these arguments suggest that retirement should
be related not to the level of technology, but to its rate of change.
9For more on this point see Costa (1998).
5“horizon eﬀect” of increased life expectancy. But a second eﬀect arises from the fact that
increases in life expectancy may reduce the uncertainty surrounding whether a person will
live into old age. Where mortality is high, individuals are unlikely to live into old age, and so
any savings for a planned retirement would likely be wasted. The optimal program in such
circumstances would be to plan continue working in old age, should such an eventuality arise.
In this case, a reduction in mortality, by making survival into old age more likely, can reduce
the planned age of retirement. We call this second channel the “uncertainty eﬀect.”
Whether the uncertainty eﬀect or the horizon eﬀect of increased life expectancy is more
important depends on the manner in which life expectancy increases, as well as on the nature
of the individual’s optimization problem. After setting up the general problem in section 3.1,
we make this point in sections 3.2 and 3.3 by considering two diﬀerent forms of life-expectancy
increase, which produce opposite eﬀects on the retirement age. Finally, in section 3.4, we use
actual data to assess which eﬀect should have been dominant given the historical change in
the life table.
3.1 Setup of the Problem
Consider an individual who receives utility from both consumption and leisure. We assume
that there are only two possible levels of labor supply: a person may either be fully employed
or retired. We also assume that once a person retires, he may not re-enter the labor force.10
Let γ represent the increment to utility from leisure due to retirement (that is, the diﬀerence
between utility from leisure before retirement and after). For convenience, utility from leisure
and consumption are taken to be separable. An important feature of this utility function is
that marginal utility of retirement leisure does not decline with the length of retirement –
that is, there are no decreasing returns to retirement.1112
The instantaneous utility function is,
10The question of why retirement usually takes the form of a sudden and complete withdrawal from the
labor force is a diﬃcult one, and we do not address it here.
11This does not mean that utility from consumption and leisure are not treated symmetrically. There may
be decreasing returns to leisure within a given day, but this does not eﬀect the retirement decision since the
length of the workday is taken as ﬁxed. Allowing for decreasing returns to the period of retirement would
be analogous to writing down a utility function in which there were decreasing returns to total lifetime (as
opposed to instantaneous) consumption, so that if the discount rate were zero, doubling the lifespan and
keeping annual consumption constant would not double utility from consumption.
12We also do not consider the possibility that the utility from leisure, or the dis-utility from work, rises with
age. This would be a further explanation for why leisure is concentrated at the end of life.
6U = ln(c) if working (1)
= ln(c) + γ if retired.
The assumption that utility from consumption is given by the log function is made so that
changes in wages will not, by themselves, aﬀect the optimal age of retirement. In general,
changes in wages (holding interest rates and mortality constant) will have both income and
substitution eﬀects on the demand for end-of-life leisure. With log utility these just balance
each other, and so the derivative of the optimal retirement age with respect to the wage is
zero. If utility is more curved than the log function, then the income eﬀect will dominate,
and increases in wages will lead to a reduction in the optimal retirement age. We explore
this eﬀect further in section 4.








where R is the age or retirement, T is the age of death, and R ≤ T.








where P(x) is the probability of being alive at age x. Note that in this case, R is the planned
age of retirement, but an individual who dies before age R will not experience any retirement
at all. Since the only uncertainty that we admit to the model is about the date of death, and
since this uncertainty is not resolved until it is too late to do anything about it, individuals
will form time-consistent plans for consumption and retirement at the beginning of their lives.
Individuals who are working receive a wage of w. The real interest rate is r. Assets of an







We impose the condition that an individual cannot die in debt. In the case where the
date of death is know, this reduces to the familiar condition that terminal assets are zero. In
the case where the date of death is uncertain, by contrast, this condition means that assets
at all points in time must be non-negative. In other words, uncertain mortality imposes a
liquidity constraint that prevents the individual from borrowing.
73.2 Optimal Retirement with No Uncertainty
We begin by considering the case where the date of death, T, is known with certainty. The







The individual will maximize his utility subject to his budget constraint by choosing a
path of lifetime consumption, c(x) and an endogenous retirement age, R. The ﬁrst order
condition with respect to consumption implies,
˙ c(x) = [r − θ]c(x) (6)








The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the endogenous retirement age with equation
(7) give us an implicit equation for the optimal retirement age, R,
r(1 − e−θT)
γθ
= e(r−θ)R(1 − e−rR). (8)
The above equation will obviously only hold true if R ≤ T. The other alternative is that
the individual is at a corner solution, where R = T.





γeθ(T−R)[θ + (r − θ)erR]
. (9)
It can be shown that this derivative is positive if optimum R < T. Thus in the case where
there is no uncertainty, increases in life expectancy will lead to increases in the retirement
age.13
The dashed line in ﬁgure 4 shows how increases in life expectancy aﬀect retirement for
a particular set of parameters. The ﬁgure shows that the retirement age rises with life
expectancy.14
13The derivative in equation 9 is positive since the necessary condition for the second order condition to
maximization to hold is that θ > (r − θ)e
rR.
14In ﬁgure 4 we used the following values for the parameters: r = 0.06,θ = 0.03,γ = 1.
83.3 Optimal Retirement with Uncertainty and No Liquidity Constraints
We now turn to the case where the date of death is uncertain. Improvements in mortality
take the form of changes in age-speciﬁc death probabilities.
We begin by considering a form of uncertainty that can be handled tractably in an analytic
model. We then turn to a more general consideration of uncertainty, in which we must use a
dynamic programming algorithm to ﬁnd optimal retirement ages and consumption paths.
To introduce uncertainty, suppose the individual has a constant probability ρ of dying.









As mentioned above, uncertainty about the date of death imposes a liquidity constraint,
so that assets at all times must be non-negative. This in turn means that many individuals
will die holding positive wealth (although not necessarily, since an individual may choose
to work until he dies and hold no assets). Thus accidental bequests will be generated. We
ignore these bequests, assuming in eﬀect that they are thrown away.16
In general optimization problems with liquidity constraints cannot be solved by using
standard analytic techniques. In this section we make the model tractable by assuming that
r > ρ+θ. This guarantees that individuals will have rising consumption paths over the course
of their lifetimes, and thus will hold positive assets at all times. In other words, we choose
parameters such that the liquidity constraint never binds. In the next section, where liquidity
constraints are considered explicitly, we can relax this constraint on parameters.







The individual will maximize his expected utility subject to his budget constraint by
choosing a path of lifetime consumption, c(x), and an endogenous retirement age, R. The
ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption implies,
15Throughout this paper, we are concerned only with how mortality aﬀects retirement and saving decisions,
so we think of “birth” as being the beginning of working life. When we consider actual life tables, we begin
our analysis assuming that the individual has already survived to age 20
16If individuals place positive value on bequests, but still value them less then their own consumption, then
our main qualitative results will continue to hold.
9˙ c(x) = [r − θ − ρ]c(x) (12)









The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the endogenous retirement age together with the








As in the certainty case, this equation for retirement age will hold only in the case where
retirement age is not at a corner solution. In this case the relevant corner solution is that
R = ∞, in other words, the individual plans never to retire.




−Re(r−ρ−θ)R + Re−(ρ+θ)R + r/(γθ + ρ)2
(r − ρ − θ)e(r−ρ−θ)R + (ρ + θ)e−(ρ+θ)R . (15)
It can be shown that this derivative is positive for large values of R. Thus, the initial
eﬀect of reductions in mortality (starting from a high level of ρ) will be to reduce the age of
retirement. However, once retirement age has fallen, it is possible that further improvements
in mortality can raise the age of retirement.
This partial equilibrium setup is suﬃcient to show the endogenous emergence of life cycle
saving. For suﬃciently high rates of mortality, individuals will ﬁnd it optimal to set the
planned date of retirement, R, to inﬁnity: in other words, they will simply plan to work
until they die. The solid line in ﬁgure 4 show the relationship between retirement and life
expectancy (which is just 1/ρ) for a particular set of parameters. Notice that R is the planned
age of retirement, but than many people will not live long enough to reach it. Thus there
is no inconsistency in having the retirement age be greater than life expectancy. Figure 4
shows the key result: as life expectancy rises, the planned age of retirement falls!
Figure 4 also allows for an explicit analysis of the role of uncertainty in aﬀecting re-
tirement. In the case where the date of death is known (the dashed line), increases in life
expectancy aﬀect retirement only through the “horizon” eﬀect. By contrast, in the case where
increases in life expectancy take place due to a falling probability of death, such changes in
10life expectancy will be associated with both a change in the agent’s horizon and a change
in the uncertainty surrounding life expectancy. Thus changes in retirement in this case (the
solid line) will reﬂect both the “horizon” and “uncertainty” eﬀects. The diﬀerence between
the solid and dashed line, then, is the pure uncertainty eﬀect. It can be seen in ﬁgure 4 that
for low life expectancies, the uncertainty eﬀect is large, and so the retirement age is much
higher under uncertainty than under certainty. As life expectancy rises, however, the gap
between these two diminishes − indeed, it is precisely this eﬀect that allows the retirement
age in the case of uncertain death to fall even as life expectancy is increasing.
3.4 Realistic Mortality Rates
The analysis in the last section shows that for a simple speciﬁcation of mortality, increases
in life expectancy can actually cause a decline in the age of retirement. In other words, it is
theoretically possible that the uncertainty eﬀect will dominate the horizon eﬀect. A natural
question to ask is whether such an outcome is consistent with actual changes in mortality
that have been experienced historically. It is to this question that we now turn.
We use a discrete time version of our model to calculate optimal retirement ages for actual
mortality data. We examine life tables for US Males, going back to 1850 and forecasted
through 2050. Our procedure for ﬁnding the optimal retirement age is straightforward. We
loop through possible retirement ages, and for each one calculate optimal consumption and
asset paths subject to the constraint that assets are never negative.17 We then calculated
expected utility associated with each possible retirement age.
17Let Pt be the probability that an individual will be alive in period t, and let At be assets at the beginning






if At+1 > 0,
ct = wt if At+1 = 0.
If assets are being carried into period t + 1, then it must be the case that the usual ﬁrst order condition for
marginal utilities (adjusted by interest rate, time discount, and mortality probabilities) must hold. The only
case in which the condition will not hold is if the individual would like to shift more consumption into period
t, but is unable to do so because of the liquidity constraint. In this case he will consume all of his wages.
In the case of the problem being addressed here, we can take advantage of a special feature of mortality
rates that always holds true in the data once one moves beyond childhood: mortality rates are an increasing
function of age. This delivers the result that, as long as assets are positive, the growth rate of consumption
must be declining over time. The only time when consumption growth will not be declining is when assets are
zero, in which case consumption is constant and equal to the wages. See Carroll (1997) for a similar dynamic
programming algorithm.
11Figure 5 shows an example of our calculation of expected lifetime utility as a function of
planned retirement age, using mortality data from 1900 through 1990. The optimal retirement
age is the age at which this function reaches its maximum. The two interesting points about
the picture are that for some of the mortality data the function has two peaks, and that over
time the position of one peak versus the other peak changes. This is our main result which
is the emergence of retirement. In 1900s the optimal plan was never to retire since lifetime
utility is monotonically rising as a function of retirement age all the way to the end of life. By
contrast, in 1990 the optimal retirement age is 57. In fact in 1980 the optimal plan changes
from never retiring to retiring at age 57.18
It is interesting to note that the two possible retirement ages in year 1980, which yield
very similar levels of expected utility, involve diﬀerent strategies for lifetime consumption and
asset accumulation. These are shown in Figures 6-9. The optimal consumption and asset
paths when the expected retirement age is 57 (Figures 6 and 7) have the standard life-cycle
shape. The growth rate of consumption is highest at the beginning of life (age 20, in our
problem), because the probability of death, which functions like the discount rate, is lowest.19
Consumption growth falls over time, reaching zero at age 65, then becoming negative. Assets
grow from the beginning of life until retirement at age 57, and fall monotonically thereafter.
In the case where the individual plans never to retire, the path for consumption (ﬁgure 8)
has the same shape (although a higher level) as when retirement age is 57, until the age of 83.
After age 83, consumption becomes equal to the wage since liquidity constraint is binding.
The path of assets is diﬀerent than the previous case in two ways (ﬁgure 9): First, in the
case where there is no retirement, assets reach zero late in life, while in the case of retirement
assets in old age are always positive. The second diﬀerence between the asset paths when
the retirement age varies is in their size: When retirement is at age 57, total assets peak at
roughly 20 times annual income; when the individual plans never to retire, assets peak at 9
times annual income. (In the case where there is no retirement, the accumulation of assets
is due to the diﬀerence between the interest rate and the time discount rate.)
The important implication of ﬁgure 5 is that because of the twin peaks in the expected
utility function, small changes in the parameters will lead to large changes in expected re-
tirement age. The twin peaks structure of utility in the ﬁgure is not a result of any choice of
parameters on our part. Rather it results from the dichotomy between the two strategies for
optimal consumption mentioned above: plan for a retirement, with the risk that one might
18The γ values are calibrated as explained below. The other parameters are r = 0.06,θ = 0.03.
19See Hurd (1990).
12die early and thus have wasted all of the money saved up; or plan to pay for consumption
in the event that one lives into old age by working. There is no way to “convexify” between
these two strategies.
We have conducted robustness checks using diﬀerent values of the interest rate and the
time discount rate. We consistently got the result that reductions in mortality lead to a
discrete jump downward, rather than a gradual reduction, in the optimal retirement age.
Further, as a test of whether this two-humped pattern was somehow related to peculiarities
in the exact data in the life table, we re-ran our analysis using a more structured version
of the mortality data. Speciﬁcally, for each year, we estimated a Gomperetz speciﬁcation
in which the log of the probability of death was regressed on a constant and on age, using
data starting at age 20. We then used the ﬁtted values from these regressions as data in our
optimization program. The resulting ﬁgure looked very similar to the one that we present
here.
Taken literally, this two-peaked pattern would imply that there should be a sudden shift
in behavior from never retiring to planning for a large retirement. Obviously this is not what
is observed in the data, but we do not think of this as a major failing of the model. In the real
world, heterogeneity, institutions, learning, and a host of other factors would tend to cause
retirement ages to adjust slowly, rather than jumping all at once, in response to a change in
mortality.
The optimal retirement age for diﬀerent life tables and for diﬀerent values of parameters
are given in table 1. We calibrate the value of γ, the parameter that determines the utility
of leisure in retirement. Speciﬁcally, for each set of values for r and θ, we ﬁnd the value of γ
which makes the optimal retirement age using the 1980 life table equal to 65. (Because of the
twin-peakedness of the optimal retirement function, it is often impossible to ﬁnd a value of γ
which will yield an optimal retirement age of exactly 65. In these cases, we choose the value of
γ that will yield the largest retirement age that is lower than 65.) We then calculate optimal
retirement ages for life tables from other years. The emergence of retirement in response to
falling mortality as shown in Figure 5, is also evident here for diﬀerent parameter values.
4 Income vs Uncertainty Eﬀects on Retirement
In the model as set up in the previous section we suppressed any income eﬀects on retirement
by using the log utility function. One natural extension of the model is to allow for income
eﬀects, and to see how income eﬀects interact with uncertainty. Technically, this is simply
13a matter of replacing the log utility function with a Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility
function. As long as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is greater than one, increases in
income will ceteris paribus lower the retirement age.
In ﬁgure 10, we examine how the uncertainty eﬀect varies with the degree of risk aversion.
For each value of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σ, we choose a value of the utility
from leisure, γ, such that the optimal retirement age when life expectancy is 75 is equal to 65.
We then consider the eﬀect of changing life expectancy. As the ﬁgure shows, the more curved
is the utility function (that is, the higher is σ), the less optimal retirement age responds to
changes in life expectancy.20
Figure 11 shows the results of combining changes in wages and mortality. We set the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to three. The three panels of the ﬁgure consider three
diﬀerent levels of the wage: 1930, 1980, and 1990. Within each panel, we look at expected
lifetime utility as a function of retirement age for four diﬀerent sets of life table values: 1900,
1930, 1980, and 1990. Again, we use data from 1980 to calibrate the key parameter γ.
Speciﬁcally, we choose γ so that, given the 1980 wage and 1980 mortality probabilities, the
optimal retirement age in 1980 is 65.
The ﬁgure makes it clear that the two eﬀects work in a complementary fashion. For a
given level of mortality, an increase in the wage makes retirement more optimal; and similarly,
for a given level of the wage, a decline in mortality makes retirement more optimal. Given the
1980 wages, for example, planning for a retirement is not optimal using mortality probabilities
from 1930, but it is optimal using mortality probabilities form 1990; similarly, given 1980
mortality probabilities, retirement is not optimal given the 1930 wage, but is optimal given
the 1990 wage.
Experimenting with other values of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion leads to the
conclusion that as risk aversion rises, the income eﬀect increasingly comes to dominate the
uncertainty eﬀect as the major cause of retirement. However, using higher values of the coef-
ﬁcient of relative risk aversion also leads to a somewhat troubling conclusion: the model using
these values of the risk aversion parameter generates dramatically falling age at retirement
as income rises further. That is, unlike the uncertainty eﬀect (which predicts a one-time rise
in retirement, followed by rough constancy of the fraction of life spent retired), the income
eﬀect predicts that retirement will come to represent an ever larger fraction of life as income
rises.
20The values for the other parameters are, r = 0.06,θ = 0.03.
145 Conclusion
Our paper has shown how a reduction in mortality can lead to a shift in the life-cycle pattern
of labor supply. High mortality leads to uncertainty about the age of death, and in this
environment individuals will ﬁnd it optimal to work until they die. As mortality falls, it
becomes optimal to plan for a period of leisure at the end of life−that is, for retirement.
We show, using data on actual changes in the life table over the last century, that this
“uncertainty eﬀect” can more than compensate for the more intuitive eﬀect of higher life
expectancy in raising the retirement age.
As we stressed in the introduction, we do not think of the uncertainty eﬀect as the only
explanation for the rise in retirement that has taken place over the last century. Changes in
government policy and productive technology, as well as the eﬀect of higher income in raising
the demand for leisure, all play a role. Further, interactions of several of these channels are
likely to be important. For example, we have shown that the uncertainty eﬀect interacts
with the income eﬀect to produce a larger reduction in labor force participation than either
channel separately. A project for future work in this area will be to apportion causality for
the increase in retirement between the diﬀerent causes we have discussed.
A second dimension along which the model can be extended is to examine how changes in
labor supply feed back, via increased life cycle savings, into higher levels of income. That is,
one could marry our model of endogenous retirement and savings with a growth model. In
contrast to the standard Overlapping Generations model, in which the fraction of life spent
working is ﬁxed, our model suggests that the emergence of retirement, and thus of life cycle
saving, may be one of the key steps in the process of modern economic growth.
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Parameters γ 1900 1950 1980 2030
σ = 1
r = 0.04,θ = 0.02 0.96 ∞ ∞ 55 55
r = 0.05,θ = 0.03 0.90 ∞ ∞ 54 54
r = 0.06,θ = 0.03 0.67 ∞ ∞ 57 57
r = 0.07,θ = 0.05 0.82 ∞ ∞ 53 53
r = 0.06,θ = 0.05 1.07 ∞ ∞ 49 49
σ = 2
r = 0.04,θ = 0.02 1.25 ∞ ∞ 54 54
r = 0.05,θ = 0.03 1.12 ∞ ∞ 53 53
r = 0.06,θ = 0.03 0.75 ∞ ∞ 57 56
r = 0.07,θ = 0.05 0.94 ∞ ∞ 52 52
r = 0.06,θ = 0.05 1.40 ∞ ∞ 46 47
σ = 3
r = 0.04,θ = 0.02 1.33 ∞ ∞ 58 58
r = 0.05,θ = 0.03 1.16 ∞ ∞ 57 57
r = 0.06,θ = 0.03 0.77 ∞ ∞ 59 58
r = 0.07,θ = 0.05 0.96 ∞ ∞ 55 54
r = 0.06,θ = 0.05 1.44 ∞ ∞ 51 51
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